Attention modulates visual perception and is generally considered inextricably linked with conscious awareness: we become aware of stimuli as we attend to them, and we attend to stimuli as we become aware of them. Recent evidence suggests that attention can also modulate the effects of stimuli that remain invisible, and a natural explanation is that attention enhances weak perceptual representations, bringing them closer to conscious threshold even if they do not reach that threshold. However, there is also the possibility that attention may modulate neural processes that are entirely separate from those supporting conscious perception: sensorimotor mechanisms that do not create awareness however much they are enhanced. Here we provide evidence in support of this second hypothesis by showing that attentional cueing can modulate the behavioral response to invisible stimuli in a way that is distinct from enhancing their visibility. We used a masked-prime paradigm that produces a negative or positive compatibility effect depending on the perceptual strength (duration or brightness) of the prime. We found that attention enhanced the effect of both visible and invisible primes and also increased the likelihood of detecting the prime (i.e., boosted perceptual strength). Crucially, the pattern of attentional influence on priming could not be explained by attentional modulation of the prime's perceptual strength but was predicted by a direct attentional influence on the nonconscious priming process itself. Therefore, in addition to regulating what we perceive, attention seems to influence our behavior through sensorimotor processes that are not involved in conscious awareness.
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priming ͉ unconscious ͉ motor inhibition ͉ action T hroughout the study of cognition it has been widely assumed that attention and conscious awareness are closely linked (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) . A wealth of behavioral, neurophysiological, and imaging evidence has shown that attention facilitates the processing of consciously perceived stimuli (8) (9) (10) and can also make us aware of stimuli that might otherwise escape awareness (11, 12) . Conversely, stimuli that are not attended are usually not perceived, and this is reflected in the names given to neurological disorders or experimental paradigms that diminish conscious awareness without directly interfering with sensory processing: e.g., ''attentional blink'' (13), ''inattentional blindness'' (14) , and ''inattention'' in visual extinction or neglect (15, 16) . Moreover, neural processes that appear to proceed automatically and unconsciously are sometimes referred to as ''preattentive,'' meaning outside the influence of attention (17) . This seemingly close union between attention and consciousness, both physiologically and conceptually, makes it natural to assume that they are interdependent. Indeed, it is hard to resist the teleological notion that the principal function of attention is to be ''the sentry at the gateway of consciousness'' (18) .
However, recent evidence suggests that attention may enhance neural processes irrespective of whether they reach consciousness. Initial suggestive evidence came from a ''blindsight'' patient, GY, who, despite cortical damage that renders him partially blind, can successfully guess the orientation of stimuli he denies seeing. When the location of the unseen stimulus was indicated by a preceding attentional cue, GY performed such ''blind'' orientation discrimination faster (19, 20) . In people without brain damage, nonconscious processing can be assessed by using brief stimuli that are masked and thus rendered impossible to identify. It is known that subthreshold processing of such ''masked primes'' can nevertheless affect subsequent responses to perceived stimuli, and some studies have found that focusing attention in time or space can modulate these priming effects (21) (22) (23) . A natural explanation for such attentional modulation of invisible stimuli might be that attention boosts the perceptual representation of weak stimuli toward conscious threshold, enhancing their ''perceptual strength,'' and thus their priming abilities, even if they still do not quite reach awareness. In this explanation, attention still acts on the same neural processes that lead to perceptual awareness, in line with existing models and concepts of attention and consciousness (24) (25) (26) .
However, there is a more intriguing possibility. In addition to any effect on perceptual threshold, attention may also act on sensorimotor processes that are independent of representations that support conscious awareness. Thus, attention may act at two conceptually distinct places in the neural processing that follows presentation of a weak stimulus: it may boost perceptual representations, making the stimulus more likely to be consciously perceived, and it may in parallel boost any sensorimotor processes activated by the stimulus. Such sensorimotor mechanisms may be wholly unconscious, and boosting them may have no effect on how visible the stimulus is.
Unfortunately, measuring attentional modulation in conventional priming tasks cannot distinguish between these two ways in which attention might affect subliminal processing because any attentional boost to priming will appear to act in the same way as increasing the prime's brightness or duration: both will enhance the priming effect. Thus, it might be natural to assume that attention modulates priming precisely because it enhances the prime's perceptual strength in a similar way to modulating brightness or duration. To tell whether attention might actually modulate subliminal processing in another way, we have to give attention a chance to modulate the priming effect in a way that is dissociable from the effect of boosting the prime's perceptual strength toward conscious threshold.
To address this difficulty we exploited an interesting priming task in which the priming effect changes from negative to positive as the prime's perceptual strength is increased (27, 28) . In this task, participants simply make left or right responses to arrows pointing leftward or rightward. Each target arrow is preceded by a brief prime arrow, which is backward-masked by an array of randomly arranged lines. Under these conditions, primes with a duration sufficient to make them consciously visible produce a positive ''compatibility effect,'' such that responses are faster if the prime and target point in the same direction (compatible) than if they point in opposite directions (incompatible). However, briefer primes that are rendered invisible (nondiscriminable) by the mask produce a negative compatibility effect, such that compatible primes cause slower responses than incompatible primes.
To study unconscious processing, the choice of mask is important because it must successfully render the prime invisible, but some masks have been criticized for interacting with the prime to produce confounding priming effects (29, 30) . These problematic masks were composed of overlapping arrows similar to the primes and targets themselves. Instead, we used masks composed of overlapping lines, which have recently been shown to produce robust negative compatibility effects without the problematic confound produced by arrow masks (31) .
The negative compatibility effect produced by the invisible primes has been modeled as an automatic inhibitory mechanism that suppresses motor initiation elicited by subthreshold stimuli (27, 28) . It parallels other automatic negative effects known in cognitive science, such as ''inhibition of return,'' in which attention is biased against returning to recently attended locations. In the masked-prime case, however, the inhibition seems to occur within the motor domain rather than on perceptual representations, because it is ''effector-specific''; primes associated with left or right foot movements do not cause inhibition of manual responses (32) . The priming effect turns positive for stronger, visible primes either because stronger positive priming simply overcomes the inhibition or because the inhibitory mechanism is overruled by the conscious representation of the prime's occurrence (27, 28) .
For our purposes it does not matter that invisible primes happen to produce a negative effect and visible primes produce a positive effect, rather than vice versa, or, indeed, that the crossover from negative to positive seems to coincide with the threshold for consciously perceiving the prime (27) . What is crucial is that invisible stimuli can produce a robust measurable effect that is distinct from, and not just a weaker version of, the effect of stronger stimuli. In other words, because enhancing the prime's perceptual strength (by presenting it for longer) does not simply enhance the priming effect, an attentional enhancement of the priming effect can be distinguished from an attentional enhancement of perceptual strength. If attention makes a weaker prime more like a stronger one, the priming effect should become more like that produced by a stronger prime: less negative and more positive. If attention independently enhances the sensorimotor priming process elicited by the weak prime, the negative effect of the subliminal prime should be enhanced (becoming more negative, not more positive). Thus, the slightly complex pattern of priming (negative then positive) known to occur as the invisible prime's perceptual strength is increased allows us to make opposite predictions for attentional modulation of the prime's perceptual strength and for attentional modulation of the subliminal priming effect itself.
Results

Exp. 1.
We manipulated attention to the primes with a ''precueing'' procedure (33) , which required the primes to be presented randomly in one of two locations (see Fig. 1 ). The targets also occurred randomly in one of these locations, and a control experiment, without attentional cues, showed that the negative compatibility effect was the same whether the primes and targets were in the same location or different locations: For primes and targets in the same location, mean response time (RT) in compatible and incompatible trials was 374 ms and 355 ms, respectively, giving a negative compatibility effect of 19 ms, whereas for primes and targets in different locations, mean RT in compatible and incompatible trials was 377 ms and 357 ms, respectively, giving a negative compatibility effect of 20 ms (for more details see Supporting Methods, which is published as supporting information on the PNAS web site). This finding was expected because the priming effect is thought to be elicited by subthreshold response initiation after the prime, not from a perceptual interaction between the prime and target stimuli (28, 32) .
We then introduced attentional cues by brightening a rectangle around one of the possible prime and target locations (see Fig. 1 ). These ''exogenous'' or ''stimulus-driven'' attentional cues were very similar to those used in many previous studies (33, 34) , but they were much nearer fixation than is normally the case, because we wished to keep the masked primes and targets near fixation. A second control experiment confirmed that attention was successfully biased to the cued location: in the absence of masks and targets, responses to primes in the cued location were speeded relative to the uncued location (341 vs. 355 ms; t ϭ 6.7, P Ͻ 0.001; see Supporting Methods for more details). It is worth noting that this attentional effect, although statistically significant, is smaller than that normally seen in cueing experiments, presumably because cued and uncued locations were only 4°a part (cueing paradigms normally use between 10°and 20°). We manipulated the perceptual strength (visibility) of the primes by altering their duration, choosing 20 ms for ''invisible'' primes predicted to cause a negative compatibility effect, and 70 ms for ''visible'' primes predicted to cause a positive priming effect. In objective tests of conscious perception, participants showed chance performance for discriminating the direction of the 20-ms primes (mean accuracy 50% and 51% for cued and uncued primes, respectively), whereas performance was comfortably above chance for the 70-ms primes (mean accuracy 92% and 88% for cued and uncued primes, respectively).
The first main result was that the negative compatibility effect elicited by invisible primes was significantly modulated by the attentional cues: it was enhanced when the location of the invisible prime was cued compared with when the opposite location was cued (t ϭ 4.0, P Ͻ 0.01; see Fig. 2 ). More importantly, the cueing effect for invisible stimuli was opposite to that found with visible stimuli: The compatibility effect for invisible primes was made more negative by cueing, whereas the effect for visible primes became more positive (ANOVA interaction: F (1,11) ϭ 20.4, P ϭ 0.001; see the Fig. 2 legend for more details on RT and error rate). If attention merely boosted the sensory representation of the invisible stimulus, thus making it more likely to be consciously perceived, we would expect attentional cueing to reduce the size of the negative compatibility effect, making it more similar to the positive effect of the stronger visible prime. Thus, the extra negative effect found is difficult to explain as a consequence of an attentional enhancement of perceptual strength toward conscious threshold. Rather, it seems that the attentional effect may come from enhancing the automatic, unconscious sensorimotor process that the invisible stimuli elicit, rather than from making the stimulus representations more likely to penetrate through to consciousness.
Exp. 2.
In a second experiment we aimed to more fully characterize the relationship between attentional modulation of invisible stimuli and perceptual strength by measuring the attentional effect on primes as we manipulated their perceptual strength stepwise across the conscious threshold. We did this by changing the duration of the prime from 10 ms to 70 ms in 10-ms steps. When participants were asked to guess the direction of the prime (after the main experiment), discrimination performance rose steadily from chance for 20-ms primes to Ͼ90% for 60-ms primes, and the probability of success was increased by cues at the prime's location compared with cues at the other location (Fig. 3A) . A cued prime of 30 ms, for example, produced performance approximately equivalent to an uncued prime of 40 ms, and a cued prime of 40 ms was like an uncued prime of 50 ms. Thus, the magnitude of the attentional modulation was equivalent to Ϸ10 ms (or Ϸ25%) extra prime duration. These results confirm previous evidence that attention can modulate perceptual threshold (12, 35) and are consistent with models in which attention enhances perceptual contrast or saliency (24, 25) . Such enhancement is reported to occur in many areas of visual cortex (10) and may operate on neuronal activity that is below the threshold for awareness as well as on suprathreshold activity.
The critical question is this: Does this attentional modulation of perceptual threshold explain attentional modulation of sub- 
The overall error rate was low (4.6%), and, like RT, the errors displayed negative compatibility effects for invisible primes (Ϫ2.1% and Ϫ1.9% for cued and uncued primes) and positive effects for visible primes (2.2% and 3.5% for cued and uncued primes). This main effect of prime visibility was significant (F (1,11) ϭ 12.7, P Ͻ 0.01), but there was no effect of cueing (F (1,11) ϭ 1.0), nor was there an interaction between visibility and cueing (F (1,11) ϭ 0.8).
Fig. 3. Performance in prime discrimination blocks in Exps. 2 and 3. As the perceptual strength of the primes was increased [by manipulating duration in Exp. 2 (A) and brightness in Exp. 3 (B)]
, discrimination performance rose from chance (50%) to Ϸ90%. Note that cued primes reach threshold earlier than uncued primes; the attentional effect at nominal threshold (75%) is equivalent to Ϸ10 ms duration in Exp. 2 and 20 -40 cdm Ϫ2 in Exp. 3. liminal priming? We can answer this question because increasing the prime's perceptual strength is predicted to change the priming effect gradually from negative to positive (27, 28) . If attention acts on the invisible primes by modulating their perceptual strength, then modulating attention and modulating prime duration should have equivalent effects (as occurred for discrimination performance; Fig. 3A ). This means that the results for uncued primes should simply be shifted along the axis of perceptual strength by Ϸ10 ms relative to cued primes, because the effect of having attention drawn away from the prime is the same as the effect of decreasing the prime's duration: both affect the perceptual representation of the prime. As illustrated in Fig. 4A , an uncued prime of 40 ms should behave like a cued prime of 30 ms, and this shifts the results for uncued primes to the right, such that the duration required to create a given compatibility effect is slightly more for uncued primes than for cued primes.
Alternatively, if attention acts on sensorimotor processes that are independent from the representations that support conscious awareness, the subliminal priming effect produced by any given prime should simply be enhanced by attention. Thus, as illustrated in Fig. 4B , the pattern of compatibility effects for cued primes would simply be an exaggeration of the pattern for uncued primes: a change in amplitude rather than a shift along the axis of perceptual strength.
The results of the second experiment show that attracting attention toward or away from the primes modulated the amplitude of the compatibility effect, and there is only a small hint, if anything, of a shift along the axis of perceptual strength ( Fig.  4C ; for more details see Table 1 , which is published as supporting information on the PNAS web site). The most crucial results are those for primes of 30 ms, 40 ms, and 50 ms, which in the perceptual strength account (Fig. 4A ) are predicted to produce a peak of negative compatibility for uncued primes similar to the peak produced by cued primes with shorter duration. Instead, consistent with the prediction in Fig. 4B , the results show that the effect of uncued primes is simply reduced in amplitude relative to cued primes, such that the relative effect of cueing reverses near the point at which the priming itself crosses from negative to positive. Thus, the attentional effect is not explained by boosting the perceptual strength of the subliminal stimuli toward conscious threshold. Instead, it indicates that attention can act on sensorimotor processes that are independent of the representations that support consciousness awareness. threshold. An uncued prime needs greater duration to have the same effect as a cued prime, shifting the results along the axis of prime duration (illustrated with black arrows). We have depicted an absolute shift of 10 ms (alternatively, a percentage shift of, e.g., 25% would mean that the horizontal gap between cued and uncued curves would be smaller than depicted for short prime durations and larger than depicted for long prime durations). The dashed gray lines mark the prime durations probed in Exp. 1, illustrating how the opposing cueing effects for invisible and visible primes (Fig. 2 ) might have arisen with this hypothesis. (B) Predicted pattern of results if attention modulates subliminal priming independent of perceptual strength and thus independent of the representations supporting conscious awareness. Cueing modulates the amplitude of the compatibility effect at each prime duration (illustrated with black arrows). For comparison with A we have depicted the same curve for the cued condition (we use the cued condition as baseline because in most masked-prime experiments the location of the prime is attended). As above, the dashed gray lines mark the prime durations probed in Exp. 1. (C) Results of Exp. 2, which conform to prediction B: Although there is perhaps a small shift along the x axis between the cued and uncued conditions, the main attentional effect is a modulation of priming amplitude. Thus, the attentional modulation cannot be explained as a modulation of perceptual strength alone (prediction A), and this result supports the idea that attention can act on representations that are independent of those supporting conscious awareness. Error bars are standard errors of the cueing effect at each prime duration. See Table 1 for details of RT and error rates in each condition. (D) Results of Exp. 3, which also conform to prediction B and replicate all of the essential elements of the previous results with a different manipulation of perceptual strength (brightness instead of duration). Error bars are standard errors of the cueing effect at each prime duration. See Table  2 , which is published as supporting information on the PNAS web site, for details of RT and error rates in each condition.
Exp
strength in an alternative way, changing the brightness (or contrast) of the prime, produced an equivalent pattern of results. We fixed the duration of the prime at 40 ms and made all of the stimuli gray instead of white, allowing us to choose four levels of brightness for the prime that spanned discrimination threshold (Fig. 3B) . Again, primes in the cued location were discriminated slightly better than uncued primes (tested after the main experiment), consistent with attention lowering threshold by enhancing perceptual contrast (12, 24, 25, 35) .
The main results of Exp. 3 mirrored those of Exps. 1 and 2 in all of the essential elements (Fig. 4D) . Low-contrast invisible primes produced a negative compatibility effect, which changed to a positive effect with brighter primes. Cueing modulated these compatibility effects in opposite directions, making the effect of weak primes more negative and the effect of strong primes more positive (for more details see Table 2 ). Importantly, the pattern of attentional modulation took the form of a change in amplitude (as depicted in Fig. 4B ) rather than a shift along the axis of perceptual strength (as depicted in Fig. 4A ). Thus, it is not explained by a boost in perceptual strength (contrast or brightness in this case); instead, the pattern of results supports the idea that attention can act independently on nonperceptual sensorimotor representations.
Discussion
It has long been known that attracting attention to a certain location makes us more likely to consciously perceive weak stimuli in that location. In other words, attentional orienting modulates perceptual threshold, boosting the perceptual strength of near-threshold stimuli (12, 35) . This attentional inf luence was demonstrated for our paradigm by improved discrimination performance when participants were asked to guess the direction of masked arrows (Fig. 3) . This type of finding has been extended recently by measuring attentional modulation of priming effects elicited by invisible stimuli (22, 23) and also by measuring attentional modulation of adaptation to nondiscriminable illusory lines (36) . It seems that the inf luence of attention extends beyond near-threshold stimuli to subthreshold stimuli that still remain invisible even after attentional enhancement.
Our main finding is that attentional modulation of subliminal priming cannot be fully accounted for by the established idea that attention modulates the perceptual representations of the stimulus, boosting them over, or nearer to, conscious threshold. Attention enhanced the priming effect elicited by invisible stimuli (Figs. 2 and 4 C and D) in a pattern that was not predicted by an enhancement of the prime's perceptual strength (as illustrated in Fig. 4A) . Instead, the pattern of results was predicted by a direct attentional enhancement of the unconscious sensorimotor priming effect (Fig. 4B) . There was one previous hint of this dissociation between the effects of attention and perceptual strength in masked priming: Schlaghecken and Eimer (21) (Exp. 3) used cueing while investigating differences between primes presented at fixation and in the periphery, and they found a slightly greater positive compatibility effect for cued primes. In a different study, on the other hand, increasing the perceptual strength of peripheral primes by delaying mask onset was found to reverse the compatibility effect (37) .
Thus, we have measured two separate attentional effects on invisible stimuli: one that enhanced their visibility (Fig. 3) and one that independently enhanced unconscious sensorimotor processes initiated by the invisible stimuli (Fig. 4 C and D) . This second type of attentional modulation potentially represents a wider role for attention outside the perceptual realms traditionally studied, and the scope and limits of such attentional modulation of unconscious processes will need to be thoroughly investigated. From a practical point of view, it may be necessary to control for attentional effects in any study of unconscious sensorimotor processing.
A clue to how the second type of attentional modulation may occur can be found in the apparent independence of some sensorimotor processes from perceptual processes. For example, whereas visual illusions may affect our perception of an object's size or position, it has been reported that visually guided reaching can be relatively immune from such perceived distortions (38, 39) . Similarly, patients with brain damage may be able to act appropriately on objects despite dramatic perceptual disruption that would seem to preclude such accurate actions (40) . Furthermore, neurons in some sensorimotor areas are activated by visual stimuli more quickly than neurons in many areas of visual cortex (41) , indicating that sensorimotor mechanisms can be initiated without relying on a hierarchy of visual processing to feed them perceptual information. Thus, there appears to be some dissociation between ''vision for perception'' and ''vision for action'' (42), giving scope for attention to act on these systems independently.
In fact, many components of our behavior seem to be underpinned by fast automatic sensorimotor processes that operate outside the conscious domain (43) . These automatic mechanisms allow behavior to be efficient but are generally thought to proceed inflexibly (44) , so that goal-directed behavior must be supervised by a ''top-down'' conscious attentional system. Our data, combined with other recent evidence, show that unconscious processing is more flexible than previously suspected. Moreover, there may be two kinds of unconscious process: subthreshold activation that would reach awareness if boosted in strength, and wholly unconscious sensorimotor mechanisms that never reach awareness however strongly activated. Our results suggest that the latter, as well as the former, is susceptible to attentional modulation. This would explain how the priming effect we studied, an automatic sensorimotor phenomenon, can be enhanced independently from enhancing the perceptual representations that support conscious awareness. Because so much of sensation and action remains unconscious, we might speculate that the unstudied role of attention in this domain may prove to be as functionally important as its role in guiding conscious behavior.
Nonconscious processes have also proved to be more flexible than previously supposed in their response to context. Greenwald et al. (45) found that subliminal priming in a number classification task was sensitive to contextual memory resulting from previous practice. Kunde et al. (46) demonstrated that the impact of subliminal priming depends on the participants' cognitive intentions to respond to certain stimuli. Similarly, Eimer and Schlaghecken (47) found context specificity effects in their original experiments with the masked-prime paradigm we have used: arrow primes have an effect only if the participant currently wishes to respond to arrow targets. If instead the participants must respond right and left to the letters R and L, arrow primes have no effect, despite previous training that associated the arrows with right and left responses. A recent functional MRI study suggests that the source of such cognitive contextual influences may be an area of frontal cortex known as the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) (48) . It is possible that this contextual modulation, like the attentional modulation we report, may affect sensorimotor processes that are independent of the perceptual representations supporting awareness. Further study will be needed to investigate this interesting possibility.
Methods
Exp. 1. Participants fixated on a central cross and responded with a left or right button to the direction of arrows (targets) presented randomly above or below fixation inside one of two outline rectangles (see Fig. 1 for illustration and stimulus timing). Before the target, a prime occurred in one of the two rectangles for either 70 ms (visible condition) or 20 ms (invisible condition). This prime was identical to one of the four possible targets (leftward or rightward arrows in top or bottom rectangle) and was immediately followed by masks of randomly oriented lines presented for 100 ms in both rectangles. An attentional cue was presented 100 ms before the prime by brightening one of the rectangles. The location of the cue and the location or direction of the prime had no predictive value for the location or the direction of the target arrows, and participants were told this. After the main experiment, we measured perceptual awareness of the primes by asking participants to guess their direction in trials where the targets were omitted. For more details see Supporting Methods.
Exp. 2.
We manipulated the duration of the primes from 10 ms to 70 ms in steps of 10 ms, crossing the threshold of conscious awareness. In all other ways the procedure was the same as for Exp. 1. We also measured discrimination performance for the direction of the prime, in the absence of the targets, for each prime duration between 20 ms and 60 ms, producing a psychometric function for each participant from which perceptual threshold (e.g., the duration needed to produce 75% correct) can be determined (see Fig. 3A ).
Exp. 3. The procedure was similar to Exp. 2 except that we fixed the duration of the prime at 40 ms and manipulated its contrast to cross the perceptual threshold. The background was dark gray [10 candelas per square meter (cdm Ϫ2 )], and other stimuli were lighter gray: fixation cross, targets, and masks were 40 cdm Ϫ2 ; outline rectangles were 15 cdm Ϫ2 , brightening to 40 cdm Ϫ2 for the cue; primes varied from 20 cdm Ϫ2 to 160 cdm Ϫ2 . As before, we also measured discrimination performance for the direction of the prime for each prime contrast (see Fig. 3B ).
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